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ABSTRACT 
In 2012 the Australian public witnessed three important examples of 
trolling play out in the public sphere that are the focus of this paper: the trolling of 
Julia Gillard’s Facebook page when she attempted to discuss education policy, the 
anonymous trolling of Charlotte Dawson’s Twitter page, and the trolling of Magda 
Szubanski on YouTube after she came out on The Project. These attacks may seem 
similar in that a public persona has been ridiculed and denigrated in flamboyant 
onslaughts. However, we will argue that there are important differences in the 
effects of these attacks, and that underpinning these are differences relating to the 
individual persona, the social medium and the nature of the utterance. The attacks 
on Gillard and Szubanski are primarily descriptive attacks on a deliberate and 
somewhat stage-managed public performance of identity, not a call to action. On the 
other hand, the anonymous trolling of Charlotte Dawson, which led directly to her 
attempted suicide, is clearly a performative utterance from the start, meant to have 
consequences on the object of attack. In Dawson’s case, the separation between her 
public persona and her private self is far less distinct than in the case of Gillard or 
Szubanski. These instances demonstrate that trolling exists on a performative 
continuum, engaging in constant disruption, but also lending itself to the production 
of social action. The kind of impact trolling will have depends, thus, on the 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2012, in Australia, one of our most successful comedians was denigrated as a ‘bush 
pig’ merely for coming out as a lesbian; a host on a popular reality show was encouraged to ‘kill 
herself’; and the then Prime Minister was ordered to cook dinner for one of her constituents and 
asked about the colour of her pubic hair. Such is the nature of unpoliced public debate. In all 
three cases, the social media sites of each of these women provided those with a sexist and 
homophobic agenda an extraordinary lien to literally write whatever they wished. This was 
accommodated through the phenomenon of trolling, which, while not especially new, certainly 
took on a new vigour at this time. Although public figures have always been at the mercy of 
debate and abuse, the public is generally well aware of the risk of legal action to punish specific 
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slander or vitriolic insult uttered in conventional media. Not so with the Internet, where trolls 
seem to believe that they are able to write whatever they please, with few, if any, consequences 
to themselves.1  
This paper will discuss three cases where the level of trolling was both unprecedented 
and especially vicious. They include the trolling of Madga Szubanski on YouTube after she came 
out on The Project; the trolling of Julia Gillard’s Facebook page when she attempted to hold a 
forum on education policy; and finally, the trolling of the Twitter account of Australia’s Next Top 
Model host, Charlotte Dawson, after she attempted to gain justice over a specific instance of 
malice. In Szubanski’s case, the trolls’ comments, while evidently hurtful, seem almost generic to 
the occasion: a woman comes out as a lesbian and is immediately denigrated for her looks. The 
Gillard trolling contains many features of relatively generic attack as well: she is taunted with 
insults which have been used against powerful women for decades in being told to ‘get back to 
the kitchen’ and that her voice shrieks like ‘nails on a blackboard’. Far worse, in her case, were 
comments relating to her recently deceased father, in clear reference to Alan Jones’ statement 
that her father would have ‘died of shame’ at his daughter’s ‘lies’ (Hall). The Dawson example is, 
by far, the most extreme. In this instance, this ‘mean’ reality TV judge was told to ‘please go hang 
yourself’, to ‘stick her head in the toaster’ and sent images of bloodied corpses after she 
defended one of her supporters from a nasty attack regarding the woman’s deceased husband 
who had killed himself (Hornery and Hall, Baird). This assault had the most severe 
consequences as Dawson was hospitalized for attempted suicide and sadly, she subsequently 
succeeded in committing suicide in 2014. 
At first glance, all three cases may seem similar in that a public persona was attacked 
and denigrated in a flamboyant manner using the remarkable capacity of social media to do so. 
In this paper we argue that there are important differences in the effects of these attacks, 
relating to the performative and affective nature of the utterances in each case, the persona and 
the social media platform.  
J.L. Austin’s theory of the utterance posits a basic difference between illocutionary (or 
descriptive) speech acts, and perlocutionary speech acts which function as a call to action. Using 
this, admittedly controversial, distinction, it is relatively easy to argue that the trolling of 
Szubanski and Gillard, while cruel, is nevertheless illocutionary. The trolling of Dawson, on the 
other hand, is a clear example of the perlocutionary utterance, designed to have direct 
consequences for the object of attack. 
The instances that we discuss in this paper demonstrate that trolling exists on a 
performative continuum, from disruption to the production of social action. Trolling can be 
described as the Internet’s signature mode of discursive politics, at once disruptive for the sake 
of an anarchistic vision of political life, while using the freedom of the Internet to insert well-
placed and necessary commentary in an idealistic vision of true democracy. Our examples show 
that trolling can be both repetitively banal and tremendously effective, both utterly pointless 
and utterly shameful. We assert that the kind of impact trolling will have depends on its 
discursive context and on the very nature of the utterance itself. The force of the speech act is, 
thus, bound up with its affective intensity. 
Trolling has been defined in a variety of ways. For a number of writers, trolling is 
considered to be a time-wasting activity, where a participant deceitfully posing as genuine 
draws others into pointless and circular discussions (Donath, Dahlberg, Herring et al, Turner et 
al). This relatively benign version of trolling takes its cue from a fishing term, where a baited 
line is dragged behind a boat (Oxford English Dictionary), but could also be connected with the 
Scandinavian hairy monster hiding beneath a bridge hoping to snare hapless strangers (Herring 
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et al 372). This latter example leads to far more malevolent conceptions of trolling behaviour. 
Trolling has sometimes been contrasted with ‘flaming’, defined as insulting, provoking or 
rebuking messages sent specifically to vulnerable or naïve participants (Herring et al 372). 
However, the two frequently merge, as, in more recent years, trolling has become a catch-all 
term for a suite of negative behaviours (Hardaker 224). 
Rebecca Rafferty notes in her 2011 study that trolls who are deliberately insulting tend 
to be motivated by three reasons: informal social control, dominance and entertainment. 
Informal social control is usually carried out by people known to the victim and it is effectively a 
form of ‘cyber sanctioning’ for perceived bad behaviour (27). Dominance, on the other hand, is 
defined as ‘the attempt to hurt, humiliate, or influence the behaviour of another individual in 
order to gain or regain access to some valued resource’ (Rafferty 33), and is generally carried 
out by former partners in romantic relationships who are anxious to either regain control over 
the partner, or to make them miserable. The most important of the three motivations for our 
purposes in this paper is the entertainment motivation. In Rafferty’s study, entertainment was 
given as the most popular reason for cyber bullying or online aggression (37). The desire is to 
annoy or to provoke the victim into exhibiting anger or misery through persisting with 
harassment long after being asked to stop (37). Anonymity is vitally important to this sort of 
trolling as it allows perpetrators a sense of power over their victim, and a feeling of 
invulnerability from any form of consequences to themselves (38). Such trolling is considered 
‘successful’ when the victim finally responds in the way suggested, or when others applaud the 
troll’s posts (Hardaker 233). 
It would seem then that trolling, at least of the malicious sort, is conducted by people 
who ‘take pleasure in disrupting the social order out of anger, perversity or contempt’ (Herring 
et al 382). While trolls interviewed in Jenny Brockie’s Insight programme claimed their trolling 
was motivated by the desire to create comic effect and to expose hypocrisy, illogical argument 
or fallacious reasoning, or as a form of ideological resistance, one might argue that malicious 
trolling, whether banal or incisive, would rarely be motivated by anything other than very 
personal peeves. The relation between the public persona of the troll as manifested in their 
online discourse, and their private selves is complex and apparently contradictory. As Elizabeth 
Grice notes in relation to the case of troll Brenda Leyland, who committed suicide after being 
exposed for her relentless online abuse of Kate and Gerry McCann, “the image of the incoherent, 
half literate troller who spits poison as a reflex compensation for lack of self-esteem” is far from 
the truth (22).  
The notion of ‘persona’ is valuable here in distinguishing the effects (and affects) 
experienced by public identities under attack in instances of trolling. The concept of persona as 
we are using it here is based on the poststructuralist argument that identities are not 
psychologically stable entities but are produced through acts of discourse. Identity is “not a 
fixed property of individuals but … part of an ongoing process by which subjects are 
constituted” (van Zoonen 123). The production of any persona is then an ongoing performance, 
which is open to contestation. As Judith Butler has observed, such a production is the 
“reiterative and citational practice by which discourse produces the effects that it names” (2). 
Thus, persona is a fundamentally performative and denaturalised concept referring not to an 
autonomous and stable identity, but to an array of constructions. Public figures such as Gillard, 
Dawson and Szubanski operate with one or more public persona, in addition to their private 
‘selves’, and use social media in a more or less ‘managed’ way to perform these personas. 
Marshall and Barbour argue (following Jung) that persona is: 
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a strategic public identity, not necessarily in tension with an inner soul of self and 
individual … but a way to manage the various dimensions of life and its public 
formation of the self. Persona can be seen as something that needs to be managed 
and … a personal practice that is performed in order to enter the social world in 
some particular way (4). 
For celebrities and other public figures who are required to negotiate the relation between the 
public and private personae on a daily basis, there are significant risks if the boundary is 
unstable or the distinction unclear. The consequences of a close versus distant relation between 
their public and private persona can be profound, as these case studies will demonstrate.2  
We argue that we can learn a great deal about the nature and power of trolling and its 
effects by using theories of the utterance – specifically speech act theory and implicature theory. 
J.L Austin first introduced the distinction between utterances whose pragmatic function is to 
describe a state of affairs, which he called constatives (3) and those that perform an action, 
which he termed performatives (6). That is, to say or write something is not merely to produce a 
sequence of words with certain meanings, but to perform a kind of act, which may then have 
particular consequences. Austin (109) further distinguishes the act performed in saying 
something (its illocutionary force) and the effect or result of the act (its perlocutionary force). In 
relation to this paper, a troll may attempt to insult someone by calling them a ‘slut’ and the 
person may indeed feel hurt or insulted (the perlocutionary act) or may merely laugh off the 
insult as an obvious attempt to insult or provoke. Perlocutionary force is thus not predictable 
from nor a direct consequence of the illocutionary act, and also cannot be judged based on the 
grammatical form of the utterance; it is very much linked to the ripples of affect, as we’ll discuss 
further below. 
Numerous types of speech acts can be distinguished and these can be grouped into four 
basic categories: statements, questions, offers and commands (Halliday 69). These categories 
are based on the understanding that all utterances are performative in the sense that all 
utterances, in social contexts of interaction, have illocutionary force. The purely constative act 
which is a neutral statement of fact not designed to produce any corresponding response from 
the hearer is a theoretical type which is rare in actual contexts of interaction, including online 
discourse. Nevertheless, we argue that it is theoretically necessarily and analytically useful to 
distinguish between speech acts that are primarily descriptive and those which are directed 
towards inciting action. To understand the grammatical structure and performative nature of 
trolling, we will consider the illocutionary and perlocutionary forces, not only of ‘obvious’ 
performatives (commands, offers, threats, and so on) but also various types of statements and 
questions.  
Trolls may make statements, ask questions, offer to perform services, or command 
others to act. In many cases, these trolling utterances can be perceived as speech acts which 
seem to flout, or perhaps ignore altogether, that which H. Paul Grice described as the 
cooperative principle in conversation, and in discourse more generally.3 Grice’s principle asserts 
that participants in a dialogue will attempt to be as informative, truthful, relevant, clear and 
unambiguous as they can in order to communicate effectively and to maintain relationships. 
When these rules of communication are deliberately flouted, participants may deduce 
alternative meanings since the literal meanings do not appear to comply with the cooperative 
principle. These implicatures require participants to infer meanings other than those stated. 
While it may seem that the language used in the three cases we are discussing is characterised 
by a consistent violation of the cooperative principle, nevertheless these speech acts are clearly 
meaningful, and so do take on the status of implicatures. For example, several of the utterances, 
such as when Julia Gillard is told to ‘Get my dinner ready’, or Charlotte Dawson is instructed to 
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‘put your head in the toaster’, are commands which are clearly not meant to be taken literally, 
and therefore must be interpreted as insults. 
Both are impossible acts: Julia Gillard is being addressed as down-trodden housewife in 
relation to her interlocutor; Charlotte Dawson would find it impossible to place her head inside 
a toaster. However, they form part of the conversational pact with the interlocutor that requires 
an interpretation of their ‘relevance’. In both cases, they demand that the reader infer that these 
women are not worthy of respect: the command to cook is used to denigrate Julia’s status as 
Prime Minister; an act designed to deform her face, and thus her ability to carry on her career, is 
prescribed for Charlotte. 
To better understand the nature of such speech acts, we also need to consider the way 
illocutionary force is bound up with affect. By affect, we mean the capacity of the body to affect 
or be affected (Massumi, Parables 15). Following Spinoza, Brian Massumi further describes 
affect as a ‘pre-personal intensity corresponding to the passage from one experiential state of 
the body to another’ (Massumi, ‘Autonomy of Affect’ 222). We use it here particularly as it 
relates to changes in emotional states, and include the body’s capacity to incite affects through 
discourse. 
While the concept of affect as it has been taken up by cultural studies is usually regarded 
as outside signification and as non-discursive, Massumi does acknowledge the possibility that 
affect can be discursively captured (see Gilbert 14). Atkinson and Yell argue that there is a 
complex relation between affect and discourse – since utterances are enunciative acts which 
emanate from bodies, even in cyberspace – and these bodies use discourse to react to bodily 
experience and to transmit and evoke further affective states in themselves and others. Trolling 
is a discursive act that provokes affects and incites further discourse and sometimes other 
forms of embodied social action. We argue that the grammar of trolling speech acts cannot be 
understood without consideration of its capacity to provoke affects. Indeed, this is the driving 
force underpinning acts of trolling.  
In the following we analyse both the types of affects and the types of speech acts 
performed in these instances of trolling. The grammar of trolling utterances allows affect to be 
linguistically ‘captured’ and transmitted or transmuted, with varied illocutionary and 
sometimes perlocutionary force. Trolls use affective triggers including explicitly emotive terms 
which present positive or negative evaluations, often of high intensity (‘fat’, ‘ugly’, ‘disgusting’), 
as well as using expletives and abusive language or evoking scenarios which invite a strong 
emotional response. These, when combined with directly performative utterances (e.g. 
commands like ‘kill yourself’), produce powerful affective/perlocutionary force. 
These affects are in turn further mitigated or enhanced by the affordances of different 
social media platforms, such as YouTube, Facebook and Twitter. Twitter is a “microblogging 
site” with a “directed friendship model” (Marwick and boyd 116) in which participants choose 
to follow particular Twitter account holders. Facebook is also based on a directed friendship 
model but its settings can be adapted to enable public or private access to content, and when 
settings are public anyone can view or comment on the site’s content. Facebook sites can be 
specific to an individual or used by a group or a public figure, enabling strategic presentation of 
a persona which may be more or less detached from a private self.  Both YouTube and Facebook 
function as repositories or databases for content created by an individual or organization or 
hosted on behalf of a third party (Paolillo 156). They have the additional feature of allowing 
posts or comments to be added and to be visible long after the interaction has taken place. In 
the case of Facebook, this content is usually directly related to the construction of a particular 
persona, their tastes, interests, relationships and activities. Whereas YouTube, as a video 
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hosting site, is the least personal of the three platforms, often parasitic on other media (such as 
movies, music videos and broadcast television) and not specific to an individual, unlike Twitter 
and Facebook. All three social media afford public opportunities to participate in extended 
dialogue (and thus opportunities for trolling) but in the case of Twitter, the short 140 character 
tweets directly address the Twitter account holder and more closely approximate real-time 
conversation whereas posts on Facebook and YouTube enable lengthier posts and can be 
responded to over a period of hours, days or even months, and thus lack the rapid-fire 
immediacy of Twitter. 
CASE STUDY 1: MAGDA SZUBANSKI ON YOUTUBE 
When Magda Szubanski publicly ‘came out’ on TV panel show The Project in February 
2012 a clip was immediately posted on YouTube, where it rapidly accumulated a large number 
of comments, and comments continued to be added over a period of some months. Amongst 
apparently genuine attempts to debate Australian government policy and cultural attitudes to 
same-sex marriage, and messages of personal support for Magda’s courage in expressing her 
own sexuality and her support for gay marriage, were inflammatory statements denigrating 
homosexuals in general (particularly lesbians), and homophobic insults directed at Magda. 
The reaction of these YouTube trolls was perhaps unexpected, given Magda’s well-
known and well-loved public persona. She is possibly best known for her work on the television 
series Kath and Kim, where she played the loveable, but gormless, Sharon, forever on the 
receiving end of Kim’s jokes and aspersions. Magda previously had a well-known comic persona 
in other shows as well, such as Fast Forward and Big Girl’s Blouse, where she once again played 
likeable characters. Her acting career extended to playing Esme Hoggett in the Babe films, which 
were internationally popular and the science fiction series Farscape.  On top of her acting career, 
Magda was also a spokesperson for Jenny Craig as she publicly battled her weight problems, 
with the support of the Australian public. In short, Magda had developed a warm, funny, 
charming public persona by the time she decided to reveal her sexuality. Even when she did, 
this was not considered much of a ‘scoop’ in journalistic terms. As the Sydney Morning Herald 
noted, it was ‘one of the entertainment world’s worst kept secrets’ (Quinn). Yet, the trolls were 
vitriolic in their abuse, leading to the inescapable conclusion that it wasn’t Magda’s confession 
they were concerned with in particular, but instead, the notion of lesbianism in general and the 
idea of anyone ‘coming out’ at all.  
The trolls were primarily concerned with the existence of any lesbians in their midst, 
which is evident in their utterances that predominantly took the grammatical form of 
descriptive third person statements – they were about Magda (or gays/lesbians in general) 
rather than being addressed directly to her. The only time the second person (‘you’) was used in 
a statement was to issue a generalised (future) threat to supporters of homosexuality (‘Magda is 
going to hell and so are all you fag enablers’), albeit one not to be carried out by the speaker but 
by an unnamed higher power. Some included the use of the first person to project the speaker’s 
opinion (‘Wow I’m shocked… NOT’, and ‘I notice lots of fat cake eaters are carpet munchers’). 
Such statements violate Grice’s principle for the speaker to be truthful (i.e. sincere) and 
unambiguous, requiring other participants on the YouTube site to read the first example as 
sarcasm and the second as an insult (and one in which the participant must be complicit in 
recognising and decoding the metaphor of a ‘carpet muncher’).  
Within the ongoing ‘conversation’ on this YouTube comments page, these evaluative 
statements are speech acts which are designed to incite responses – the posters are not making 
a statement as a disinterested contribution to knowledge, but an affectively loaded expression 
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of opinion, designed to incite equally affectively loaded responses. The evaluative terms are 
strongly negative homophobic terms of abuse (‘ugly dyke’, ‘carpet muncher’, ‘carpet licker’), 
insults based on physical appearance (‘fat ugly unfuckable pig’, ‘a whale like her’, ‘disgusting to 
look at’, ‘disgusting overweight bitches’) and include generic statements such as ‘no man in his 
right mind would want to fuk [sic] a whale like her’. 
These insults are perverse but also predictable and banal. The use of explicit 
homophobic language is crude, unskillful and reductive, with its references to appearance, body 
weight and physical attractiveness and the use of animal terms. Magda Szubanski was being 
informed that her ugliness would preclude heterosexuality – effectively an implicature asking 
readers to infer boundaries and makes specific that Magda is to be reviled as an outsider. The 
language expresses primal affects of revulsion, disgust and contempt. While these statements 
undoubtedly have the potential to hurt and contribute to a discursive universe in which 
homophobia continues to exist, their reflexive rehearsal of primitive homophobia seems to 
blunt the affective force of these utterances. One potential reading of these utterances is that the 
trolls are taking a position just to get a reaction through such ‘ludicrous rants’ (Narraine 146). 
However, the trolls gained little traction or support for their trolling. Some posters 
responded to the trolls’ comments, but if anything, the trolls incited increased positive 
responses in support of gay marriage and in praise of Magda Szubanski. Furthermore, there is 
no evidence of any perlocutionary effects on the primary subject of these trolls, Magda herself, 
who is not a participant in this conversation and apparently unaffected by the existence of these 
comments. The effects (and affects) of the trolling are mitigated by the affordances of YouTube, 
in that its primary function is as a video hosting site and it is not personal to an individual. 
Furthermore, because both the original content (in this case the footage from Magda’s 
appearance on The Project) and the sequence of comments on this, are archived on the site, the 
debate does not necessarily occur in real time, nor does it necessarily involve the denigrated 
individual as an interlocutor. Finally, the pace of the debate can be extended over days or 
months, again diminishing its affective intensity as a concentrated onslaught of comments. In 
terms of the definition of trolling, this is an example of ‘unsuccessful trolling’ (for the trolls), and 
perhaps offers some support for the notion that trolling can indeed make a positive contribution 
to internet discourse, since in this case it activated others to articulate and defend their views in 
opposition to discursive positions that were intolerant, unreasonable or inflammatory. 
 CASE STUDY 2: JULIA GILLARD ON FACEBOOK 
In October 2012 then Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard engaged in what was 
touted as a ‘first for a federal politician’ (Hall), conducting a live chat session on Facebook with 
the aim of discussing education policy and the national curriculum with members of the public. 
For approximately an hour the debate ran smoothly, with questions and answers on various 
education-related topics, however the session then descended into abusive trolling, with the 
most offensive remarks being posted after the Prime Minister had logged off. By ‘invading’ what 
was intended as a civil and democratic dialogue on the Prime Minister’s Facebook page, these 
trolls shifted the debate from public discourse to a highly personal attack. Unlike the trolls 
targeting Magda Szubanski on YouTube, these trolls were on a site hosted by and for 
communication with a specific person, albeit a public figure in her official capacity. The 
institutional context in which these speech acts were performed is public but directly targeted, 
thus sharpening their potential to enact not only illocutionary but perlocutionary force. Who is 
meant to be affected and acted upon is quite explicit. 
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Julia Gillard, Australia’s first female Prime Minister, was a divisive figure in Australian 
public life. Holding high public office makes very particular requirements of women in terms of 
persona management and gender identity. As Anne Cranny-Francis notes, “female politicians 
constantly deal with attacks that challenge their femininity rather than their policies and 
values” (26). What was publicly known of Gillard’s private life presented a persona lacking in 
stereotypically feminine qualities – she was in a de facto relationship with a (male) hairdresser, 
childless, and apparently not skilled in the domestic arts (much was made of the empty fruit 
bowl photographed in her kitchen). In public life, she was a strong feminist politician, heading 
up a minority government where she was required to negotiate the balance of power with 
various independents. She was an object of hatred and vilification by right-wing groups, as 
expressed in the infamous “Ditch the witch” and “Juliar” signs held by protesters at a March 
2011 rally against her government’s planned introduction of a carbon tax. Yet Gillard was also 
much admired, particularly by feminist groups, for her strong and explicit feminist principles. 
The very same day the trolling incident took place, Gillard made her famous ‘misogynism’ 
speech in the Australian parliament (October 8, 2012), in which she defended herself and 
attacked the Opposition Leader, Tony Abbott, for his gendered double standards (“Gillard labels 
Abbott a misogynist”). Subsequently anti-feminist discourse against her has lost considerable 
ground as a legitimate form of attack, most particularly in the light of the immense public 
support not only within Australia but worldwide, ironically garnered substantially via another 
social medium, YouTube, where her speech had 2,764,308 views by February 2016 (with 
32,243 likes and 2,029 dislikes). 
Gillard’s public persona was, in October 2012, one that had already been the target of 
abuse and personal attacks. In the trolling of her Facebook forum on education, the context was 
specifically a dialogue with Gillard’s public persona, however this didn’t prevent the trolls from 
attempting to target her in quite personal ways. The grammatical form and types of speech act 
employed demonstrate an escalated kind of trolling in comparison to our first case study. In this 
instance, the trolling utterances included not only constative but performative utterances, using 
the second person (‘you’) and directly addressed to Julia Gillard. In what constitutes one of the 
milder insults, one poster stated ‘Hopefully when you say “I have to go now” its [sic] back to 
your home planet’. The attacks drew on anti-feminist and misogynist rhetoric, some of it 
amounting to nothing more than primitive name-calling, such as the drawn out hissing insult 
‘SSSSSSSLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLUUUUUUUUUUUUUUTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT!!!!!!!!!’). This utterance, 
while expressing a strong affect of sexual contempt, does not require any action from the Prime 
Minister.  
Likewise, the trolls also asked rhetorical questions, which expect no response but have 
the illocutionary force of insults because of the implicatures they generate. Asking Julia Gillard 
‘How’s your dad?’ was deliberately cruel and deeply offensive given the wide public knowledge 
that the Prime Minister had recently lost her father – and that talkback host Alan Jones had 
made an after dinner speech castigating Julia Gillard by saying her father ‘died of shame’ at his 
daughter’s lies. It fails the Gricean principle of relevance at a literal level (the question is quite 
unrelated to the stated topic of education), but has strong relevance and affective resonance in 
relation to these recent events, which would have been well-known to all accessing the 
Facebook site. Another poster asked ‘Are your pubes as radiant, shiny and glorious as mine?’ – 
again, not a sincere request for information, but a boundary-violating and lubricious speech act, 
with the illocutionary force of an insult. 
These statements and questions, while sexist, derogatory and insulting, have no 
particular perlocutionary force, although they do have strong affective potential, and contribute 
to the overheated environment of the Facebook page. Some trolls did address direct commands 
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to Gillard, including telling her to ‘Lube up’, ‘Get my dinner ready’ and ‘McPiss off’ (Hall, Whyte). 
‘Lube up’ and ‘Get my dinner ready’, using sexist discourse to put down the Prime Minister and 
attempt to assert the primacy of phallocentric power over political power.4 
Here again the trolls are violating the Gricean principle of relevance, in order to 
generate the implicature that it is Gillard’s gender which is of overriding relevance, not her 
political performance or her education policies. All of these commands, issued apparently by 
predominantly male trolls, assert the speaker’s power over the addressee and their supposed 
right to tell this upstart woman what to do. But in reality Julia Gillard is never going to cook one 
troll’s dinner for him, nor perform sexual acts for another; these utterances confuse the public 
persona with the private individual. The commands are ultimately hollow illocutionary acts 
with little perlocutionary force. 
The trolls on Julia Gillard’s Facebook page were enacting a specific form of anti-
feminism, and in the ensuing media coverage and online debates men, as well as women, joined 
in condemning the trolls, while others attacked Gillard for having a ‘glass jaw’ and suggested 
‘playing the victim is working wonders for her poll results’ (comments posted to Crikey.com, 
Whyte).  
The Gillard Facebook debate constitutes an example of partially successful trolling. 
While Facebook as a social media site enables dialogue directly with the site’s ‘owner’ as well as 
hosting content, it was being used in this case for a managed debate which unfolded over a 
specific and limited time-frame as an event in a politician’s public engagement schedule. The 
affordances of Facebook enabled comments to be archived and therefore on the record for 
intended target (Gillard) to read later but also allowed for the most offensive of these posts to 
be removed by her staff, meaning she may not have seen them. The trolls’ attacks did succeed to 
some extent in derailing the Facebook Education debate, but the strong affects of contempt 
articulated by the trolls’ speech acts did not appear to have a direct effect on their target, who 
was in any case constituted through a public performance in her persona as Prime Minister, 
separate from the private individual. Their ineffectiveness was compounded by the fact that 
most were made after she had logged off the site, perhaps an indication of the false bravado of 
many trolls, who use the online environment to act out aggressive behaviour they would never 
display face-to-face. As in the Magda Szubanski case, the trolls’ offensive and sexist speech acts 
did not succeed in the perlocutionary act of creating a ‘victim’, but rather incited a number of 
positive responses and expressions of support. 
CASE STUDY 3: CHARLOTTE DAWSON ON TWITTER 
On August 30, 2012, Charlotte Dawson was admitted to hospital, following an overdose 
of prescription medication. This desperate act was the culmination of weeks of online 
aggression on her Twitter account, during which her battles with depression were made clear. 
Even more pressing, in terms of her suicide attempt, were the several hours of severe abuse 
prior to the act, during which Dawson was repeatedly told to ‘go hang yourself’, ‘kill yourself’, 
‘put your head in the toaster’; described as a whore and as a ‘sad, ugly moll’; and sent images of 
bloodied corpses in an effort to make her understand her persecutors meant business (Hornery 
and Hall, Baird, Tarasov). At last, Dawson gave in to the will of the mob, posting a picture of a 
hand holding pills and two messages: ‘You win x’ and ‘Hope this ends the misery.’ 
Dawson’s final tweet on that day demonstrates the extraordinary impact anonymous 
malicious trolling can have. For, although the vicious attack began only after Dawson managed 
to name and shame one of her abusers, Tanya Heti, the rest of the trolls remain unaccounted for. 
Heti infuriated Dawson days before when she tweeted that she could understand why the 
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husband of a follower of Dawson would have committed suicide (Baird). She also responded 
with the message: ‘On behalf of New Zealand we would like you to please go hang yourself’, after 
Dawson had described her native country as ‘small, nasty and vindictive’ (AAP, ‘Posts put in 
perspective’). Dawson discovered the university Heti worked for, and had her suspended from 
employment. At this point, the real barrage of anonymous threats, insults and commands began. 
Dawson is an interesting figure in any discussion of malicious trolling. No stranger to 
conflict herself, as the well-publicised ‘mean’ judge on Australia’s Next Top Model, she insulted 
would-be models for a living. For some, her performance of this role was enough to deny her 
sympathy, or to at least temper it (Hornery). However, to engage in this form of debate is to 
misrecognise the fundamental differences between a public and a private persona. Dawson was 
a public figure, playing a part; she cannot be simply and unproblematically collapsed into a 
cardboard cut-out caricature of herself.  
Many trolls argue that their online abuse is playful (Insight, Johnston). If we look at the 
structure of the utterances in Dawson’s case, it becomes very hard to believe that these attacks 
could have been anything other than serious. The vast majority of the statements made to 
Dawson were clearly perlocutionary performative utterances; they were commands to take 
action. As the crescendo built, and the mantra ‘hang yourself’ was repeated, the commands 
gathered an urgency demanding immediate response. This command is hardly subtle, and 
requires no inference from the reader. It cannot be argued that this injunction is merely acting 
as an insult, desiring nothing more than that the reader leaves the writer alone. The addition of 
images of corpses, making visually evident the expected and required outcome, put paid to that. 
Dawson is told what to do, and preferably, how to do it. There is no flouting of the 
conversational principle here; the message is self-evident. 
Other speech acts directed at Dawson are more problematic. Dawson was told to ‘put 
your head in the toaster’, and described as ‘fat’, ‘ugly’ and a ‘sad moll’. The first command 
demands an impossible act that, were it indeed possible, would destroy Dawson’s face. Because 
it is literally impossible to carry out, it therefore generates an implicature. Flouting the 
conversational principle of clear, unambiguous speech, this strange command demands 
inference on the part of the reader that Dawson should not only die but be disfigured in her 
death. There is clear reference here to her career as a judge on a show evaluating the 
performance of models. The constatives on Dawson’s appearance disparage her looks and thus 
challenge her right to speak at all regarding the looks and the style of others. The private 
individual Charlotte Dawson has clearly been confused and conflated with her job here; her 
public persona becomes her only persona and her performance of the performative ‘mean 
judge’ is equated with her personality. 
This kind of attack, especially on women, is hardly new. Dawson herself had been the 
target of such vitriol many times before. On this occasion, however, she allowed it to affect her 
to such a degree that she took her pain out on her own body. Suddenly, the rude constatives and 
the appallingly violent performatives produced affect in the off-line world. In discussing why 
this should be the case, it is necessary to consider the discursive context of the statements, and 
the medium in which they were made, to determine why they had such affective intensity. 
Dawson was a self-proclaimed avid Twitter devotee: “I like Twitter. I like the sense of 
community it creates, the ideas it gives us access to, its ability to make people feel closer 
intellectually and personally than they might otherwise be geographically or demographically.” 
(Byrnes). Even after her attack, she had no intention of stopping her use of the medium and 
indeed did not until her suicide in February 2014. 
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This statement, and her devotion to Twitter, lead us some way to discovering the 
reasons for her response to her abusers. Twitter is a conversational medium; fast moving, 
information can be shared back and forth with the speed of an off-line conversation. It doesn’t 
have all the baggage of Facebook, which asks for an enormous amount of information on its 
users, and encourages them to keep up their profile by adding posts and attachments that are 
kept in a relatively static environment, so that it is easy to follow a thread from weeks prior. 
Twitter, on the other hand, is all about the present, demanding its followers keep up with 
current developments at all times, insisting on responses constantly. Twitter is designed to be a 
relatively simple form of social media, allowing its participants the feeling of being in the same 
time as those they follow, regardless of their geographical distance. It is the very nature of the 
medium, and the spare nature of the conversation it encourages, which creates its extraordinary 
affective intensity. No-one in the off-line world would ever have conversations such as those 
held on Twitter, where simple declarations or commands take the place of extended discourse. 
On Twitter, phatic communication is cut to a minimum, resulting in a world where social cues 
are frequently lost. 
On August 30, 2012, Charlotte Dawson received a string of these simply worded 
messages, exhorting her to commit suicide in no uncertain terms. The phrase ‘hang yourself’ 
was repeated so often it became an act in and of itself: to write ‘hang yourself’ was to commit an 
act, to ‘hang’ Dawson both metaphorically in stopping her voice for a time, and literally in its 
clear demand which was ultimately followed through, although not to the letter. The closeness 
of the Twitter world was shattered for Dawson by those words. The community she had enjoyed 
engaging with turned against her, the intimacy she had experienced evaporated. The discursive 
context of Twitter, then, with its swift, unambiguous messages created such intensity of affect in 
Dawson that she overdosed. Yet, even in extremis, she reached out, yet again, with her tiny 
suicide note: ‘You win xx’. 
CONCLUSION 
In the three cases examined in this paper, the trolls conformed to certain stereotypical 
behaviour. Firstly, they chose to pick on a woman and a celebrity; two of the prime sufferers of 
vitriolic abuse online, according to Jason Wilson (cited in Hornery and Hall). Secondly, most of 
them prized their assumed anonymity, believing that this privilege guaranteed them free reign 
to say whatever they pleased. For, under the blanket of anonymity, trolls are able to ignore 
social constraints and write things they would never normally be able to say in the off-line 
world (Johnston). 
While the cases share some similarities, we have demonstrated that the effectiveness of 
trolling differs with respect to the performative and affective nature of the utterances in each 
case. Using our three case studies, we have demonstrated a continuum of speech acts, from the 
constative and primarily illocutionary, to the performative and perlocutionary. In doing so, we 
have shown how the impact of the perlocutionary, combined with specific discursive contexts, 
can lend the utterance greater and greater power. 
In the Szubanski case, the trolling took place on YouTube in response to a clip put up by 
producers of The Project. The trolls did make rude comments about Szubanski, but they were 
merely descriptive and generic. There is also no evidence that Szubanski even saw these 
comments as she did not maintain the site. Here we have an example of highly ineffective 
trolling. The utterances are generally constative, and thus have only illocutionary force. There is 
no demand for Szubanski to act in a particular way. The trolling of Julia Gillard’s education 
forum on her Facebook site is only partially effective. The trolling took place after she had 
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logged off, so was never seen by her in real time. Consisting of mostly garden-variety, constative 
insults and illocutionary rhetorical questions and commands, the comments lacked any 
relevance to the topic of conversation, and thus took on no more significance than the posturing 
adopted by playground bullies. 
Nevertheless, action was taken: the posts were removed, and the Prime Minister began 
targeting trolls in an attempt to work out ways to catch them (Matheson). Yet, as with 
Szubanski, Gillard herself did not appear outwardly perturbed by the ludicrous comments 
aimed at her public persona. This is due to the relative lack of intimacy possible on a Facebook 
page dedicated to politics, and to the inescapable fact that she elicited such messages because of 
her high status and public role, which undercuts the effectiveness of the trolls’ attempts to 
humiliate her. In the Charlotte Dawson incident, we see perlocutionary demands made 
repetitively and at fever pitch, insisting on a response. The discursive context of Twitter, 
perhaps the most intimate of the social media, contributed to increase the effectiveness of the 
statements and commands. Dawson maintained her own page and she saw every post as it came 
through, in real time. Eventually, the trolls succeeded, and Dawson attempted suicide in the off-
line world. 
It is evident, then, that discursive context is essential in determining affective intensity 
and perlocutionary consequences: the more intimate a medium, the more results trolls can 
expect from malicious messages. The form of the medium is important as well; slower moving 
social media sites, such as YouTube and Facebook, are often read asynchronously which, in 
these instances at least, tended to distract from their power. Twitter, on the other hand, with its 
extraordinarily swift turnaround, demands constant attention, and thus an online campaign can 
be devastatingly destructive. The affordances of social media also enable greater or lesser 
degrees of separation between a public figure and their audience; from a more public and 
managed persona to a relatively intimate and private ‘self’. Finally, the structure of the 
utterance differs on each medium, from the relatively lengthy messages possible on YouTube 
and Facebook, to the short, sharp commands and comments available on Twitter. The sense of 
intimacy on Twitter is also problematic for those subjected to trolling, as it encourages a sense 
of community through its real-time messaging which is as close to face-time as it is possible to 
get. The loss of this community can have dire consequences, as Dawson observed after her 2012 
suicide attempt. 
To conclude, malicious trolling is both possible and effective on all three of the social 
media platforms we looked at in this paper. However, the posts which have the greatest 
effectiveness, and especially those that create trouble in the off-line world, combine intensely 
personal and specific insults and commands with a page on a site that the victim considers 
particular to them, and which is experienced by the victim in real time. The more communal a 
page becomes, the less likely that trolling will be effective in a personal sense to an individual 
victim. The more perlocutionary and performative an utterance is, the more likely it will create 
long-lasting effects on its target. In the final degree, as we have demonstrated in this paper, 
malicious trolling can potentially lead to the death of the victim. Never have mere words been 
more powerful than in the virtual societies we now inhabit. 
 
1 Australia’s first conviction for internet trolling was in 2011, and involved the defacing 
of Facebook tribute pages with child pornography (Keim). The Australian Criminal Code Part 
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10.6 covers offences committed using the internet, including using a carriage service to menace, 
harass or cause offence (The Findlaw Team). 
2 In 2015, Lena Durham, creator and writer of the HBO series Girls, chose to delegate the 
management of her Twitter account because of abusive tweets directed at her (Milsom). 
3 Grice entitled his original paper “Logic and conversation”, however his arguments 
apply to all dialogic communication, whether synchronous or asynchronous, as it accounts for 
the inferences made by the addressee or audience (in the case of YouTube and Facebook this 
includes those reading posts “after the event”). 
4 The futility of this gesture was duly noted and commented on by others: “self- 
emasculating morons looking for a group hug” and “Some of you blokes need to have your right 
to vote revoked”, comments posted on Crikey.com (see Whyte). 
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